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NORMS AND LAW:  
PUTTING THE HORSE BEFORE THE CART 
BARAK D. RICHMAN† 
ABSTRACT 
  Law and society scholars have long been fascinated with the 
interplay of formal legal and informal extralegal procedures. 
Unfortunately, the fascination has been accompanied by imprecision, 
and scholars have conceptually conflated two very different 
mechanisms that extralegally resolve disputes. One set of mechanisms 
might be described as the “shadow of the law,” made famous by 
seminal works by Professors Stewart Macaulay and Marc Galanter, 
in which social coercion and custom have force because formal legal 
rights are credible and reasonably defined. The other set of 
mechanisms, recently explored by economic historians and legal 
institutionalists, might be described as “order without law,” 
borrowing from Professor Robert Ellickson’s famous work.1 In this 
second mechanism, extralegal mechanisms—whether organized 
shunning, violence, or social disdain—replace legal coercion to bring 
social order and are an alternative to, not an extension of, formal legal 
sanctions. 
  One victim of conflating these mechanisms has been our 
understanding of industry-wide systems of private law and private 
adjudication, or private legal systems. Recent examinations of private 
legal systems have chiefly understood those systems as efforts to 
economize on litigation and dispute-resolution costs, but private legal 
systems are better understood as mechanisms that economize on 
enforcement costs. This is not a small mischaracterization. Instead, it 
reveals a deep misunderstanding of when and why private 
enforcement systems arise in a modern economy. 
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  This Essay provides a taxonomy for the various mechanisms of 
private ordering. These assorted mechanisms, despite their important 
differences, have been conflated in large part because there has been a 
poor understanding of the particular institutional efficiencies and 
costs of the alternative systems. Specifically, enforcement costs have 
often been inadequately distinguished from procedural or dispute-
resolution costs, and this imprecision has produced theories that 
inaccurately predict when private ordering will thrive and when the 
costs of private ordering overwhelm corresponding efficiencies. The 
implications for institutional theory are significant, as confusion in the 
literature has led to overappreciation of private ordering, 
underappreciation of social institutions, and Panglossian attitudes 
toward both lawlessness and legal development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Among the most salient features of modern courts are that they 
are expensive, slow, and inaccurate. Parties to a contract 
unsurprisingly anticipate many of these shortcomings and write 
contracts that can reduce the costs, delays, and mistakes that are often 
associated with enforcing agreements in court. Common strategies are 
to write contracts with detailed substantive provisions, choice-of-law 
clauses, and—especially—arbitration clauses. 
Of course, even detailed contracts are costly and cumbersome to 
enforce, and parties frequently seek nonlegal mechanisms to enforce 
their agreements. Professor Stuart Macaulay is credited with 
triggering a renaissance of scholarly inquiry when he reported that 
businesspeople try to enforce agreements without resorting to legal 
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coercion.2 Although the observation seems self-evident—perhaps 
only in retrospect—it marked the start of a growing scholarly 
fascination with the world of extralegal enforcement: law and society 
scholars inquired into the social structures that induced contractual 
compliance,3 law and economics scholars examined the extralegal 
institutions that maintained economic governance,4 and legal 
historians investigated how commercial agreements were sustained in 
premodern times in the absence of court ordering.5 
Among the most important strands of scholarship on extralegal 
enforcement have been inquiries, most famously by Professor Lisa 
Bernstein, into comprehensive private arbitration systems, or private 
legal systems.6 This research primarily consists of case studies of 
industry groups in which a community of merchants, under the 
auspices of a trade association, require commercial dealings to 
conform to standard contracts and trade practices, agree to resolve all 
disputes through private industry arbitration, and appoint well-
respected fellow merchants to serve as arbitrators. Merchants who fail 
to comply with arbitration decisions are expelled from the trade 
association and are targeted with economic sanctions, including 
monetary judgments and the foreclosing of commercial opportunities, 
and frequently with noneconomic social sanctions as well.7 
Unfortunately, scholarship of industry-wide arbitration systems 
has suffered from a lack of conceptual clarity. On one hand, this 
scholarship focuses on the substantive rules in private legal systems 
and contributes to doctrinal debates in contract law by observing that 
the tailored rules create administrative efficiencies in resolving 
disputes.8 On the other hand, this scholarship also emphasizes the role 
 
 2. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. 
SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963) (“Disputes are frequently settled without reference to the contract or 
potential or actual legal sanctions.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Marcel Fafchamps, The Enforcement of Commercial Contracts in Ghana, 24 
WORLD DEV. 427, 441 (1996) (discussing the fishmonger women of Accra who punish bad 
payers by screaming and shouting at them when they enter the market); Marc Galanter, Justice 
in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 27 
(1981) (“[T]he social landscape is covered by layers and centers of indigenous law.”); Macaulay, 
supra note 2, at 64 (“Sellers who do not satisfy their customers become the subject of 
discussion . . . at country clubs or social gatherings where members of top management meet.”). 
 4. See, e.g., infra notes 27, 67. 
 5. See, e.g., infra note 10. 
 6. See infra notes 30, 51, 52. 
 7. See infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 59, 61 and accompanying text. 
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of extralegal sanctions in enforcing agreements, suggesting that 
extralegal mechanisms create enforcement efficiencies.9 By focusing 
on both substantive rules and enforcement efficiencies, however, 
scholarship has conflated two dramatically different economic 
problems. In fact, economizing on the administrative costs of 
resolving disputes and economizing on the institutional costs of 
securing transactions are distinct challenges, and thus instruments 
that arise to address administrative costs need to be treated 
separately from those arising to economize on enforcement costs. The 
presence of both types of instruments in private legal systems suggests 
that they are responding to separate challenges, and perhaps that one 
challenge might have more predictive power than the other. 
This Essay aims to clarify the economic problems that private 
legal systems present and to confront the assorted instances in which 
extralegal mechanisms emerge. Once we understand the instances in 
which extralegal mechanisms arise, we can formulate better 
definitions for the assortment of informal mechanisms and recognize 
their economic significance. Part I reviews the expanding literature on 
private ordering and identifies two distinct categories of self-
enforcement mechanisms that by-and-large have been conflated: one 
category includes mechanisms in which private ordering operates 
within the “shadow of the law” and includes formal and informal 
arbitration arrangements that, despite appearing private, nonetheless 
rely on state coercion; a second category includes mechanisms that 
utilize nonstate coercive instruments to secure contracts privately, 
thus securing “order without law.” Part II highlights important 
differences between these categories and identifies their distinct 
features, and Part III then explains why private legal systems belong 
in the second category and why scholars have mistakenly conflated 
them with arbitration systems. Part IV then addresses the problems in 
conventional theory—and the adjudication-determination hypothesis 
it fosters—that has led to misunderstanding private legal systems, and 
Part V offers a replacement theory that articulates an enforcement-
determination hypothesis. In articulating the economic attributes of 
alternative enforcement mechanisms, Part V then clarifies that certain 
private ordering systems arise specifically to address enforcement 
challenges, and only by understanding these systems as enforcement 
instruments can we truly understand their economic significance. 
Central to this alternative approach is the recognition that private 
 
 9. See infra notes 27, 30 and accompanying text. 
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enforcement introduces new costs and therefore presents its own 
tradeoffs. By overlooking these tradeoffs, current theory overstates 
the true role of private ordering and overemphasizes the creation of 
adjudication efficiencies. This overlooking has not been a small error, 
but instead reveals a deep misunderstanding of when and why private 
ordering arises in the modern economy. The resulting theoretical 
confusion has led to overappreciation of private ordering, 
underappreciation for social institutions, and Panglossian attitudes 
toward both lawlessness and legal development. 
I.  THE MANY FACES OF PRIVATE LAW 
Perhaps the most efficacious feature of state-sponsored courts is 
their availability, within jurisdictional limits, to all commercial parties. 
Institutional economists and economic historians credit this very 
feature—the ability to enforce impersonal exchange—for state-
sponsored courts’ central role in propelling the economic progress of 
nations.10 In other words, state-sponsored courts’ ability to enforce 
agreements between strangers has been credited with enabling 
economic activity that had difficulty thriving in premodern societies. 
Despite this very attractive economic feature, state-sponsored 
courts also impose significant costs on those who use them—time-
consuming procedures, expensive lawyers, delayed resolutions, and 
difficult-to-predict outcomes.11 Consequently, parties in a dispute use 
a panoply of mechanisms to avoid the courtroom. This Part identifies 
two prominent species of extralegal mechanisms—those operating in 
 
 10. See, e.g., Avner Greif, The Birth of Impersonal Exchange: The Community 
Responsibility System and Impartial Justice, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 221, 222 (2006); Avner Greif, 
Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: The European Experience 1 (Ctr. on Democracy, Dev., & 
the Rule of Law, Working Paper No. 14, 2004). It is hard to overemphasize the significance of 
state institutions that enable exchange. No less than Nobel laureate Douglass North has 
advanced the strong claim that “the inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost 
enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and 
contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World.” DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 54 (1990). The world has by-and-
large listened to North’s admonition, as international agencies and external donors have 
invested heavily to promote the rule of law and law reform in many developing countries. See 
Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN AFF. Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 95, 103–04 
(discussing Western development efforts designed to effectuate rule-of-law reform). 
 11. See, e.g., THOMAS CHURCH, JR., ALAN CARLSON, JO-LYNNE LEE & TERESA TAN, 
JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 2 (1978); Thomas H. 
Cohen, Civil Trial Delay in State Courts: The Effect of Case and Litigant Level Characteristics, 95 
JUDICATURE 158, 159 (2012).  
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the “shadow of the law” and those that create “order without law”—
that parties use to resolve disputes. 
A. Shadow of the Law 
One category of mechanisms might be described as settling 
disputes within the “shadow” of the law, a metaphor first coined by 
Professor Martin Shapiro when he observed a lack of delineation 
between courts and other systems of adjudication.12 Although 
Professor Shapiro used the term to emphasize that the law’s shadow 
was distorted from law itself, the metaphor has come to represent the 
broad space in which parties understand the possibility of legal 
coercion. Professor Galanter, criticizing the legal academy’s 
preoccupation with “legal centralism,”13 argued that the law’s primary 
impact on human behavior is through its casting of a shadow.14 Thus, 
Professor Galanter argued, the “principle contribution of courts to 
dispute resolution is providing a background of norms and 
procedures against which negotiations and regulation in both private 
and governmental settings take place.”15 
Under Professor Galanter’s view of the law’s shadow, parties 
have a reasonably accurate understanding of their legal rights—
specifically, the rights that a state-sponsored court will enforce with 
the state’s coercive powers—and will manage their transactions and 
disputes accordingly. Professor Macaulay’s early observation that 
businesspeople will seek to avoid litigation, particularly if less 
expensive alternatives are available, is best understood as parties 
maximizing within the law’s shadow.16 Professors Robert Mnookin 
and Lewis Kornhauser modeled and explored the parameters of the 
 
 12. Martin Shapiro, Courts, in 5 HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 321, 328–29 (Fred I. 
Greenstein & Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975).  
 13. Professor Galanter’s criticism of “legal centralism,” a label he borrowed from Professor 
John Griffiths, targeted a “state-centered view of legal phenomena” in which scholars tend to 
discuss only those legal instruments found in public courts, to the exclusion of the broad array of 
private enforcement mechanisms. Galanter, supra note 3, at 1 n.1. The onslaught of scholarship 
exploring private ordering and private legal systems might convince Professor Galanter to 
temper his criticism.  
 14. Id. at 24.  
 15. Id. at 19.  
 16. See Macaulay, supra note 2, at 62 (“The legal position of the parties can influence 
negotiations even though legal rights or litigation are never mentioned in their 
discussions . . . .”). 
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law’s shadow in their seminal analysis of divorce settlements.17 
Moreover, the logic extends far beyond conduct that arises within a 
transactional dispute. The law’s shadow and its articulation of legal 
entitlements reduce uncertainty and establish a well-understood 
foundation from which parties pursue cooperation. Professors George 
Priest and Benjamin Klein’s economic analysis of how parties settle 
disputes falls squarely within the understanding of how the law’s 
shadow encourages private ordering within public legal constraints,18 
and the logic of the law’s shadow extends to all sorts of cooperative 
interactions, including inducing precautionary behavior by would-be 
tortfeasors and deterring property-rights violations from would-be 
trespassers. These related theories illustrate that once legal 
entitlements are clearly defined, parties can economize on litigation 
costs and reach agreements through Coasean bargaining. So long as 
the law’s shadow is well defined, parties can engage in mutually 
valuable conduct without assuming the costs inherent in state-made 
legal procedures.19 
The growing and elaborate world of arbitration also falls neatly 
within Professor Galanter’s view of the law’s shadow. Parties enter 
into agreements with the confidence that those agreements are 
enforceable by state-sponsored courts. Parties similarly understand 
the default rules in state-made contract and procedural law, and they 
use arbitration clauses and other contract mechanisms to superimpose 
alternative rules and procedures that better meet their collective 
needs. These privately crafted substantive rules are credible because 
they too are products of a legally enforceable contract, and a court 
will enforce arbitration clauses at least as aggressively as—and 
probably more aggressively than—any other legal entitlement.20 Thus, 
 
 17. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979). Professors Mnookin and Kornhauser are 
credited for popularizing the shadow metaphor.  
 18. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (“This paper presents a model of the litigation process that clarifies 
the relationship between the set of disputes settled and the set litigated.”). 
 19. Cf. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960) (arguing 
that once legal entitlements are clearly defined, parties will bargain for a socially efficient 
outcome).  
 20. The Supreme Court has accumulated a rich history of aggressively and enthusiastically 
enforcing the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, 201–208 (2006), which 
establishes “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,” Moses H. Cone Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see also CompuCredit Corp. v. 
Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 670–71 (2012) (discussing several cases in which the Court found 
that the FAA overrode other statutory provisions). Recently, the Supreme Court’s enthusiasm 
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arbitration might be considered a formalization of the informal 
mechanisms Professor Macaulay observed that are built atop court-
enforced entitlements. 
B. Order Without Law 
A second mechanism could be described as “order without law,” 
borrowing from Professor Robert Ellickson’s famous work.21 Unlike 
conduct within the law’s shadow, which builds upon legal defaults and 
relies on state-sponsored coercion, this mechanism involves a much 
more categorical rejection of state law and state institutions. In 
Professor Ellickson’s study, Shasta County ranchers (in contrast to 
what the Coase theorem would predict)22 rejected the county’s 
substantive property law and in its place articulated alternative 
substantive rules.23 To enforce these alternative rules, ranchers 
established an informal network of gossip and social sanctions, so 
violators of the community’s norms and customs suffered from scorn 
and exclusion.24 Central to Professor Ellickson’s order-without-law 
framework are substantive rules and extralegal enforcement 
mechanisms that are wholly outside the parameters of the state. His 
book earns its title because neither state law nor the law’s shadow 
plays a role in securing social order.25 Order and enforcement of 
community norms arise entirely from indigenous community 
institutions. 
Self-enforcement systems that rely on indigenous institutions 
have recently attracted enormous attention from legal scholars of all 
sorts, and although some have speculated that these methods arise 
from internal notions of justice and innate motivations of guilt or 
 
for arbitration agreements has extended to enforcing arbitration clauses despite state laws 
designed to guarantee consumers the right to litigate, CompuCredit Corp., 132 S. Ct. at 673, and 
to preclude consumers from joining class actions, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 
1740, 1750–51 (2011).  
 21. ELLICKSON, supra note 1.  
 22. Id. at 3–4 (“Shasta County Neighbors, it turns out, do not behave as Coase portrays 
them as behaving in the Farmer-Rancher Parable. Neighbors in fact are strongly inclined to 
cooperate, but they achieve cooperative outcomes not by bargaining from legally established 
entitlements, as the parable supposes, but rather by developing and enforcing adaptive norms of 
neighborliness that trump formal legal entitlements.”). 
 23. See id. at 231–32 (describing specific Shasta County norms for settling disputes and 
sanctioning undesirable behavior).  
 24. Id. at 232–33.  
 25. To the contrary, the state would only enforce its own substantive law, not the ranchers’ 
alternative. See id. at 42–48. 
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magnanimity, the economic logic might simply follow from 
Machiavelli: “[P]eople cannot make themselves secure except by 
being powerful.”26 In order-without-law systems, extralegal 
mechanisms—whether organized shunning, social disdain, or 
violence—replace state-sponsored legal coercion to bring about social 
order and are an alternative to, not an extension of, formal legal 
sanctions. Thus, this second mechanism is practically a conceptual 
opposite of arbitration. Even though both traditional arbitration and 
extralegal methods constitute efforts to avoid state-sponsored courts, 
the former relies on state-sponsored coercion whereas the latter is a 
rejection of it and relies instead on nonstate coercion. Social sanctions 
play the role of the marshal, and custom or social norms define the 
entitlements and constraints that guide parties’ conduct. 
Order-without-law enforcement relies on a diversity of 
instruments. For example, many merchant communities in early 
commercial societies that predated modern state institutions and 
state-enforced contract law used private reputational enforcement to 
secure transactions.27 Several merchant communities or merchant 
fairs—including famously the Champagne Fairs—used law merchants 
to adjudicate disputes, and commerce was foreclosed to any merchant 
with an unsatisfied judgment against him.28 Thus, rulings from law 
merchants initiated group boycotts that penalized merchants who had 
been found to breach their contractual obligations. Similar group 
sanctions are used in modern-day communities in less-developed 
 
 26. Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius bk. I (1531), in 2 
HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, AND DIPLOMATIC WRITINGS OF NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI 93, 97 
(Christian E. Detmold trans., Boston, James R. Osgood & Co. 1882).  
 27. See, e.g., Karen Clay, Trade Without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican 
California, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 202, 211–12 (1997) (examining private contractual 
enforcement among Spanish merchants in 1830s California); Avner Greif, Contract 
Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 
AM. ECON. REV. 525, 528–31 (1993) (examining private contractual enforcement among 
eleventh-century Mediterranean merchants); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in 
Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857, 868–71 (1989) 
(same); Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in 
the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & 
POL. 1, 4–6 (1990) (modeling the private adjudication system used by medieval European 
traders).  
 28. See, e.g., Milgrom et al., supra note 27, at 5 (“[M]erchants that failed to abide by the 
decisions of judges would not be merchants for long.”). For other perspectives on the law 
merchants and their reliance on assorted forms of law and legal institutions, see, for example, 
Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1158 (2012); 
and Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval 
“Law Merchant,” 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685, 690 (2006).  
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nations where contract law and independent judiciaries are not yet 
reliable. For example, Ghanaian and Vietnamese merchant 
communities, who do not have access to reliable state-sponsored 
courts, instead spread reputational information among themselves, 
such that any merchant with a checkered history is foreclosed from 
future commerce.29 Many such tight-knit communities, in addition to 
coordinating sanctions that impose economic harm, also inflict 
noneconomic punishments, including social shunning and reducing 
social status.30 Illegal transactions offer a third example of extralegal 
sanctions. For example, the mafia and other criminal networks resort 
to self-enforcement because their illegal transactions are 
unenforceable in state-sponsored courts.31 The colorful world of 
pirates, whether viewed as illegal economic conduct or as prelegal 
commerce, illustrates that self-enforcement mechanisms can fit into 
several of these categories.32 
The common feature linking these disparate enforcement 
systems is their reliance on private, nonstate sanctions to discipline 
individuals. Many of these mechanisms emerged when reliable state-
sponsored contract enforcement was unavailable. The law merchant, 
for example, constructed premodern commercial networks before the 
 
 29. See, e.g., Fafchamps, supra note 3, at 442–43 (discussing the limited role of legal 
institutions in enforcing contracts between Ghanaian firms); John McMillan & Christopher 
Woodruff, Dispute Prevention Without Courts in Vietnam, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 637, 640–41 
(1999) (describing the use of reputation mechanisms and private ordering to enforce contracts 
between Vietnamese businesspeople); Christopher Woodruff, Contract Enforcement and Trade 
Liberalization in Mexico’s Footwear Industry, 26 WORLD DEV. 979, 986–88 (1998) (tracing the 
evolution of private contract enforcement in the Mexican footwear industry as trade barriers 
were liberalized). 
 30. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1776 (2001) 
(recording several examples of noneconomic punishments used in the cotton industry); 
Fafchamps, supra note 3, at 428 (“The simplest form of retaliation is the refusal to further 
transact.”); Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: 
Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383, 407–08 (2006) 
(discussing private enforcement mechanisms, such as excommunication, utilized by Orthodox 
Jewish communities involved in the diamond trade).  
 31. See, e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An 
Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 43 (2000) 
(arguing that organized crime provides a “response to inefficiencies in the property rights and 
enforcement framework supplied by the state”); see also Richman, supra note 30, at 414 
(“Jewish diamond merchants have employed their community institutions to profit from illegal 
goods.”). 
 32. See PETER T. LEESON, THE INVISIBLE HOOK: THE HIDDEN ECONOMICS OF PIRATES 
58–70 (2009) (discussing the pirate code as a system of self-governance maintained by extralegal 
force and reputation enforcement systems). 
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administrative instruments of modern governments were available,33 
and Ghanaian merchants organized effective markets despite that 
nation’s underdeveloped public institutions.34 These merchant 
communities illustrate the possibility of organizing commerce without 
state support and reveal insights both into the ancestors of 
commercial societies and the utility of modern courts. Most scholars 
have characterized these enforcement systems as prelaw orders that 
serve important commercial functions but are readily supplanted 
when reliable public ordering emerges.35 Yet many of these systems 
persist into the modern world of developed economies, and they 
remain a viable strategy for contemporary merchants who continue to 
enforce transactions without aid from state-sponsored courts. 
Although merchants might construct these extralegal 
enforcement methods for many of the same reasons that merchants 
devise arbitration systems or seek out-of-court settlements—namely, 
to avoid the courtroom—they rest on wholly different sources of 
coercion. For those within the law’s shadow, the state ultimately 
secures transactional credibility. For those maintaining order without 
law, order rests on violence, shaming, and other forms of private 
coercion. 
II.  THE VARYING FORMALITY OF INFORMAL ENFORCEMENT 
In most legal and economic scholarship, the term “informal 
enforcement” is used to describe the sort of extralegal, private 
enforcement systems that typify those in the order-without-law 
category.36 This is an unfortunate label because formality, in the 
 
 33. See Milgrom et al., supra note 27, at 5 (“[T]he Law Merchant came to govern most 
commercial transactions in Europe, providing a uniform set of standards across large numbers 
of locations.”). 
 34. See Fafchamps, supra note 3, at 445 (“The institutional response Ghanaian firms have 
found to enforcement problems is to deal with a handful of suppliers and clients that they have 
known for years.”). 
 35. See Avner Greif, Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: The European Experience 32 
(Stanford Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 284, 2004), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 548783 (“In England . . . the 
state enabled the communities to abolish and then replace the [prelaw enforcement 
mechanisms].”).  
 36. See, e.g., Michihiro Kandori, Social Norms and Community Enforcement, 59 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 63, 63 (1992) (“It is widely recognized that in many economic transactions, 
informal means are employed to execute mutually beneficial agreements. As [Professor 
Macaulay] points out, ‘social pressure’ and ‘reputation’ are perhaps more widely used than 
formal contracts and filing suits.” (quoting Macaulay, supra note 2, at 63)); Joel Sobel, For 
Better or Forever: Formal Versus Informal Enforcement, 24 J.L. & ECON. 271, 271–72 (2006) 
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colloquial sense, varies widely across both order-without-law and 
shadow-of-the-law mechanisms. Moreover, formality is an important 
but often misleading dimension of variance. On one hand, 
mechanisms that vary in their formality exhibit important differences 
that reflect key elements of their institutional environment. On the 
other hand, differences in formality obscure key similarities and often 
reflect merely cosmetic variation. 
Degrees of formality across extralegal enforcement mechanisms 
range from what could be called spontaneous mechanisms to 
structured, or bureaucratic, mechanisms. Much as Friedrich Hayek 
credited unregulated markets for providing “spontaneous order,” 
because no deliberate coordination is required to maintain accurate 
price mechanisms,37 spontaneous reputation mechanisms similarly 
require no deliberate coordination. Shasta County cattle ranchers 
might be a paradigmatic illustration of spontaneous private 
enforcement.38 The ranchers relied only on word of mouth and casual 
gossip to spread reputational information, never formally established 
or articulated norms defining unacceptable behavior, and never 
demanded a collective commitment to inflict a coordinated 
punishment.39 Instead, information spread throughout the community 
without institutional help, and individual ranchers responded to 
specific conduct according to their personal ethical beliefs and their 
understanding of customary expectations.40 Without any centralizing 
institutions, Shasta County ranchers directed scorn and denied 
fruitful relationships to individuals who transgressed customary codes 
of conduct.41 Spontaneous reputation mechanisms, therefore, are 
highly informal: community members respond individually and 
spontaneously, without explicit coordination, yet their collective 
response to particular conduct inflicts both economic and psychic 
costs to those who violate established norms. 
 
(contrasting an informal enforcement system of relational contracting with formal legal 
enforcement mechanisms). 
 37. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1945) 
(“The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by 
the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in 
concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently 
contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.”). 
 38. ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 123–36.  
 39. See id. at 52–62.  
 40. See id. at 232–33.  
 41. See id.  
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Alternatively, there is a great deal of highly formal and often 
legalistic extralegal dispute resolution. The most pervasive instance of 
formal-yet-alternative dispute resolution is the modern world of 
arbitration. The American Arbitration Association (AAA), for 
example, is a leading collection of arbitrators that, for hire, resolve 
commercial, labor, and other complex disputes.42 Although 
advertising their services for “individuals and organizations who wish 
to resolve conflicts out of court,”43 AAA arbitrators nonetheless 
adhere to a large body of complex rules and procedures, including a 
comprehensive code of ethics and a due-process protocol.44 The 
complexity and formality of this world of alternative dispute 
resolution rivals the formality of modern state-sponsored courts and 
is a world away from how both Shasta County’s ranchers and 
Professor Macaulay’s businesspeople resolve disputes. 
Similar to many modern arbitration systems, the law merchants’ 
courts at medieval fairs were formal constructions of private 
enforcement. Private judges were designated as independent 
adjudicators of disputes between merchants, and they followed 
established protocols to acquire information and then issue and 
disseminate rulings.45 Although neither the judges nor the fairs had 
coercive authority to enforce judgments, the judges’ dissemination of 
their rulings triggered a coordinated boycott among the law 
merchants that denied business to any wrongdoer.46 In contrast to 
Shasta County’s spontaneous enforcement, the law merchants 
established formal institutions to probe into particular disputes, apply 
merchant norms in determining wrongdoing, and spread reputational 
information. And like modern-day professional arbitrators, the 
 
 42. See AAA Missions and Principles, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/ 
aaa/faces/s/about/mission (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (“The American Arbitration Association 
was founded . . . with the specific goal of helping implement arbitration as an out-of-court 
solution to resolving disputes.”).  
 43. About American Arbitration Association, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
http://www.adr.org/ aaa/ faces/s/about (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).  
 44. See Search Codes & Protocols, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/ aaa/ 
faces/rules/codes (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (displaying the codes and protocols that govern 
AAA arbitrators).  
 45. See Milgrom et al., supra note 27, at 4 (noting the importance of “legal codes governing 
commercial transactions and administered by private judges drawn from the commercial 
ranks”); Sachs, supra note 28, at 747 (“By virtue of their profession, merchants could be judged 
by the law merchant as opposed to common law . . . .”). Professor Avinash Dixit explains why 
the private judges would have been incentivized to maintain their own reputations for accuracy 
and honesty. AVINASH DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS 97–123 (2007). 
 46. Milgrom et al., supra note 27, at 3. 
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private judges had structured factfinding proceedings and needed to 
justify their conclusions.47 
Other reputation enforcement mechanisms have varying degrees 
of formality that might fall between Shasta County’s spontaneity and 
the law merchants’ formality. During Vietnam’s early stages of 
economic liberalization, for example, Vietnamese merchants relied 
on commercial-information networks, families, and common trade 
connections—a system that could be characterized as moderately 
formal.48 Nineteenth-century traders in Mexican California relied on a 
similarly semiformal network of abbeys and monasteries as 
informational conduits to learn and share reputational information.49 
And Seafax, an internet company that serves wholesalers of caught 
fish, serves as a highly formal informational instrument within a 
spontaneous reputation mechanism. The company compiles the 
payment histories of prospective buyers of fish, along with their credit 
records and other publicly available financial data, to help sellers 
decide with whom they will transact.50 These information mechanisms 
are quite formal, but they trigger a spontaneous collective 
punishment. 
In sum, although the collection of private enforcement systems 
spans time, geography, and culture, two significant dimensions of 
variation have emerged in the literature. The first concerns the source 
of coercion that secures transactional compliance, in which some 
systems rely ultimately on the state whereas others rely on private 
power. The second is the degree of formality that characterizes the 
dispute-resolution and adjudicatory mechanisms. The institutional 
features of these assorted mechanisms of enforcement can thus be 




 47. See Milgrom et al., supra note 27, at 16 (“[Law Merchants] may wish to maintain their 
reputation for honesty and diligence in order to keep the business active.”); Sachs, supra note 
28, at 765 (“Decisions reached in the courts of other cities or communities could be challenged 
and even reversed in the fair court.”). 
 48. See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 29, at 638 (“Firms often scrutinize prospective 
trading partners before beginning to transact, checking the firms’ reliability via other firms in 
the same line of business or familial connections.”).  
 49. Cf. Clay, supra note 27, at 204 (“The mission priests traded directly with the ships’ 
captains and supercargoes who brought goods to the coast.”).   
 50. Seafax Products and Services, SEAFAX, http://www.seafax.com/about/Products (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2012).  
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III.  PRIVATE LEGAL SYSTEMS—A CONFUSING HYBRID 
A particular species of private ordering system that has received 
significant academic attention is industry-wide arbitration systems 
that use both privately tailored industry law and privately ordered 
industry sanctions. In these private legal systems, a particular 
merchant community—which often comprises an entire industry 
segment and is frequently organized as a trade association—
constructs an elaborate system of law and procedure that is 
responsible for all disputes within the merchant community. Professor 
Bernstein is a leader in uncovering such systems, including those 
supporting the Diamond Dealers Club of New York,51 the National 
Grain and Feed Association (NGFA),52 and the assorted trade 
associations that govern America’s cotton merchants.53 Professors 
John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff uncover similarly 
organized reputation systems that enforce agreements made by 
America’s fresh-fish wholesalers and by New York’s dress 
 
 51. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 119–21 (1992). 
 52. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for 
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (1996). 
 53. Bernstein, supra note 30, at 1724. 
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manufacturers,54 and other scholars have brought this analytical lens 
more recently to studies of kosher certification, food labeling, and 
eco-friendly accreditation.55 
A number of common features typify these trade-association-led 
private legal systems. First, the arbitration systems are highly 
developed and comprehensive, employing fellow merchants as 
elected arbitrators, relying on specialized law, and using expedited 
procedures. These systems resemble the formality of the AAA’s 
arbitration procedures but invoke privately crafted substantive and 
procedural rules that are tailored to the needs and common concerns 
of disputing merchants, such as requiring industry-provided form 
contracts or delivery of goods by certain times and in certain 
measurements.56 Second, these arbitration systems tend to assume 
exclusive authority over all industry disputes. Not only do all 
merchants have access to arbitrators to resolve any dispute with a 
fellow merchant, merchants are also prohibited from seeking redress 
in alternative venues, including state-sponsored courts.57 And third, 
failure to comply with an arbitration ruling leads to expulsion from 
the trade association. Although expulsion in its own right is not 
terribly costly, it signals untrustworthiness to other merchants, 
thereby foreclosing future commerce.58 In other words, much like the 
 
 54. John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public 
Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421, 2436, 2442 (2000). 
 55. See generally, e.g., TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, KOSHER: PRIVATE REGULATION IN THE AGE 
OF INDUSTRIAL FOOD (forthcoming 2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Magali A. 
Delmas & Ann K. Terlaak, A Framework for Analyzing Environmental Voluntary Agreements, 
CAL. MGMT. REV., Spring 2001, at 44; Shana Starobin & Erika Weinthal, The Search for 
Credible Information in Social and Environmental Global Governance: The Kosher Label, 12 
BUS. & POL., no. 3, 2010, at 1.  
 56. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 52, at 1777 (describing the NGFA arbitrators’ hierarchy 
of authority and noting that NGFA arbitrators consult trade rules and trade practice before the 
Uniform Commercial Code and other statutes); Bernstein supra note 51, at 122 (discussing 
trade-specific, formalized rules of offer and acceptance); Bernstein, supra note 30, at 1732 (“The 
[Memphis Cotton Exchange] decides cases on the basis of the Exchange’s own Trading 
Rules . . . .”).  
 57. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 52, at 1771–72 (“As a condition of membership in the 
Association, members must agree to submit all disputes with other members to the 
Association’s arbitration system.”); Bernstein, supra note 51, at 120 (“Unless the club opts not 
to hear the case, the member may not seek redress of his grievances in court.”); Bernstein, supra 
note 30, at 1727 (“Most [shippers’ associations] require members to arbitrate disputes with other 
members as a condition of membership.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 52, at 1772 (“A member who refuses to submit to 
arbitration or fails to comply with an arbitration award rendered against him may . . . be 
suspended or expelled from the Association.”); Bernstein, supra note 51, at 130 (explaining that 
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sanctions triggered by a ruling by a private judge in the Champagne 
Fairs, an adverse arbitration ruling and expulsion from the trade 
association triggers a coordinated group boycott. 
Private legal systems have caused some conceptual confusion 
that has not only clouded our understanding of different private 
ordering mechanisms, but has also impeded a precise appreciation of 
these systems themselves. The source of the confusion is self-evident. 
On one hand, from appearances, private legal systems primarily look 
like arbitration arrangements and thus resemble the world of 
arbitration that operates within Professor Galanter’s shadow of legal 
entitlements. On the other hand, they rely on social sanctions, not 
legal instruments, to effectuate arbitrators’ rulings. At first blush, 
private legal systems appear to be an engineered synthesis of both 
arbitration and social sanctions. 
Legal scholarship in particular has contributed to the confusion 
by focusing attention on the adjudication efficiencies generated from 
industry-tailored law. Scholars observe that specialized substantive 
rules reduce the complexity and required time to generate rulings, 
that streamlined procedures reduce the costs of advancing or 
defending claims, and that expert adjudicators produce more accurate 
rulings than generalist judges or juries.59 In short, legal enthusiasts 
proclaim, private legal systems are more efficient, reliable, and 
accurate. 
One cannot blame legal scholars for focusing on the features that 
are naturally of greatest interest to them. If private legal systems were 
a Rorschach test, legal scholars—who are deeply familiar with the 
costs of adjudicating disputes in state-sponsored courts—would 
remark on the systems’ specialized law and procedures to identify 
administrative efficiencies. This enthusiasm is not just understandable 
but, in large part, quite justified. Private legal systems do generate 
 
arbitrators sometimes pursue judgment in the rabbinical courts, which have the power to 
exclude an individual from participating in Jewish community life). 
 59. See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74 
U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 661–62 (2007) (noting that parties gain certain efficiencies by relying on 
contractual norms rather than written contracts); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract 
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 619 (2003) (“A law merchant 
appropriate to our time would be a merchants’ law; and for merchants, the less publicly supplied 
law the better.”). Professor Bernstein continues to contribute to this field. See Lisa Bernstein, 
An (Un)Common Frame of Reference: An American Perspective on the Jurisprudence of the 
CESL, COMMON MKT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn .com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2067196 (“[The European Commission] should create an 
instrument with a menu of clear, detailed, contract rules . . . .”). 
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meaningful administrative efficiencies, and there is much to learn 
from the benefits of industry-wide and industry-made substantive and 
procedural rules. Appreciation for these systems’ administrative 
efficiencies has been part of, and has contributed to, what has been 
called the New Formalism, probably the most significant 
development in contract scholarship in the past two decades.60 
But this scholarly enthusiasm has led to a causality error. More 
than merely admiring the adjudication efficiencies, scholars have 
argued that merchant communities develop private legal systems 
specifically to capture these savings. Professor Bernstein, for 
example, explicitly describes private legal systems as an “opting out” 
of state-sponsored dispute resolution, suggesting that state-sponsored 
courts are a viable but merely less preferable venue, and that 
constructing a private legal system reflects a deliberate choice to 
capture litigation savings.61 Scholars of contract law and civil 
procedure frequently characterize private legal systems with the same 
language, and as achieving the same purposes, as rudimentary 
arbitration agreements.62 They thus view the private enforcement of 
arbitration rulings as conduct within the shadow of otherwise 
enforceable law, and they have conceived private legal systems to be 
close relatives of more typical arbitration systems. 
Despite appearances, private legal systems do not arise to 
economize on transaction costs and thus should not be viewed as a 
generalizable species of arbitration. To the contrary, they arise out of 
idiosyncratic circumstances, achieve different efficiencies and 
objectives, and operate under a different theoretical framework from 
 
 60. See David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842, 842 (1999) 
(“We are now in the midst of a third phase, a phase of ‘anti-antiformalism’ that seeks to 
discredit and displace Llewellyn’s claim to found commercial law in immanent commercial 
practice.”). Professor Bernstein’s scholarship has played a leading role in building the New 
Formalism movement. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 52. Two other leaders of New Formalism 
are Professors Robert Scott and Alan Schwartz. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 59.  
 61. See Bernstein, supra note 51, at 126 (“[A]rbitration is preferable to litigation because it 
is cheaper, faster, and subjects the member to [unique] pressures to pay promptly.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Adam B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of the New 
Formalism, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 48–49 (2009) (discussing industry-specific arbitration 
systems); Ted Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Bar Movement: A Study in 
Professional Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 289, 301 (2008) (characterizing the collaborative-law 
movement in divorce proceedings as “an offshoot of the preexisting alternative dispute 
resolution (‘ADR’) movement”). 
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typical arbitration.63 The defining features of these private legal 
systems are not, as much of the literature suggests, their rigorous use 
of arbitrators or their formulation of tailored law. Instead, the key 
features are how their agreements are enforced and the nature of the 
coercive mechanisms they employ. Because private legal systems rely 
on private sanctions and private enforcement, they are more 
accurately understood as instances of private ordering. They have 
much more in common with Professor Ellickson’s Shasta County 
ranchers than they do with arbitrators or other conduct that takes 
place within the shadow of the law. Accordingly, legal scholarship has 
overemphasized the role of adjudication efficiencies and has failed to 
develop a theory that accounts for private legal systems’ other 
economic attributes. And any such theory would recognize that these 
other attributes have more predictive power than adjudication 
efficiencies. 
IV.  THREE STRIKES FOR THE CURRENT THEORY 
Scholarly enthusiasm for adjudication efficiencies—minimizing 
the costs, time, and errors in producing adjudication rulings—has 
generated the incorrect conclusion that adjudication efficiencies 
induce the emergence of private legal systems. This is the 
adjudication-determination hypothesis, in which adjudication 
efficiencies are the horse that drives the private legal system’s cart of 
private enforcement. But although specialized procedures tend to 
emerge alongside private enforcement mechanisms, they neither 
cause the creation of private enforcement nor drive a departure from 
state-sponsored courts. Instead, they are merely secondary 
consequences of what ultimately is an economizing of enforcement 
costs. Three foundational mistakes in the literature on private legal 
systems reveal why industry-tailored law and industry-wide 
arbitration do not lead to private enforcement. 
First, the adjudication-determination hypothesis does not explain 
why private legal systems are relatively few in number. If the 
motivation behind private legal systems is to generate litigation 
efficiencies, then it is curious that they are so rare. It is almost beyond 
doubt that tailored law and streamlined procedures enable private 
 
 63. Cf. Charny, supra note 60, at 843 (“[T]rade association formalism . . . does not counsel 
formalism in commercial law generally; rather, it reflects, and takes advantage of, the 
idiosyncratic institutional structures of the associations themselves.”). 
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legal systems to enjoy substantial efficiencies over public courts,64 but 
why does economic research overwhelmingly indicate that reliable 
public courts are central to facilitating economic growth?65 And why 
did most historical instances of private ordering dissolve with the 
emergence of public courts?66 
Missing from conventional understandings of private legal 
systems is that, in addition to enjoying meaningful efficiency 
advantages over public courts, they also impose significant costs that 
public courts do not. These costs are unrelated to the litigation 
process, however, and instead involve the institutional efficiencies of 
enforcing contracts. Because private legal systems rely on sustained 
reciprocity, they offer credibility only to insiders and thus erect 
significant entry barriers to outsiders.67 The balancing of enforcement 
costs—the benefits of creating transactional security versus the 
imposition of entry barriers—determines the economic desirability, 
vis-à-vis alternatives, of private legal systems. It is for this same 
reason that some early systems of private ordering persisted into the 
 
 64. To be clear, Professor Bernstein deserves enormous credit for identifying and 
articulating many of the administrative efficiencies found in systems of private law. See supra 
notes 30, 51, 52 and accompanying text; see also Jason Scott Johnson, Should the Law Ignore 
Commercial Norms?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1791, 1810 (2001) (“Bernstein’s study . . . advances our 
knowledge of private commercial lawmaking institutions . . . .”). 
 65. See, e.g., NORTH, supra note 10, at 111 (“We have long been aware that the tax 
structure, regulations, judicial decisions, and statute laws . . . determine specific aspects of 
economic performance . . . .”); Avner Greif & Eugene Kandel, Contract Enforcement 
Institutions: Historical Perspective and Current Status in Russia, in ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN 
EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA: REALITIES OF REFORM 291, 318 (Edward P. Lazear ed., 1995) 
(“Economic growth in market economies is fundamentally based on the ability to exchange, 
which is limited by the ability to enforce contracts.”). 
 66. See AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: 
LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 343 (2006) (“In England . . . the state facilitated the 
replacement of the community responsibility system with one based on individual legal 
responsibility and the coercive power of the state.”). 
 67. Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive 
Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2346 (2004) [hereinafter Richman, 
Private Ordering] (“Merchants who want to transact with cotton mills and brokers must 
undergo a rigorous application process before acquiring sufficient trust to enter independently 
into transactions.”); Barak D. Richman, The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional 
Economics and Concerted Refusals To Deal, 95 VA. L. REV. 325, 335 (2009) [hereinafter 
Richman, Antitrust] (“Because a good reputation is essentially a prerequisite to enjoying 
profitable dealings, entry is largely limited to merchants who enjoy some reputational 
sponsorship and tacit insurance from existing industry players.”). 
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modern age, whereas most succumbed to the emergence of reliable 
state-sponsored courts.68 
The adjudication-determination hypothesis’ second fault, 
following from its first, is exposed by the flexibility of arbitration. If 
adjudication costs were of primary concern, then industry groups 
might affix tailored rules and procedures atop state-sponsored 
enforcement. For example, a merchant community could develop its 
own specialized legal templates and use state-sponsored courts to 
enforce arbitration decisions. Through a trade association, the 
community could require all of its members to use contracts that, 
should a disagreement arise, compel disputing parties to use a private 
dispute-resolution forum with preselected arbitrators, industry-
tailored law, and strict limitations on costly components of litigation 
such as discovery. Courts would uphold and enforce any conclusions 
by the arbitrators, and pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act69 and 
similar state-law provisions, courts would even stay any parallel 
litigation before them that is subject to an arbitration agreement.70 
Consequently, the industry could leave enforcement entirely to state-
sponsored courts while maintaining a private legal forum. This hybrid 
would be the best of both worlds: all the administrative savings from 
the privately tailored substantive law and procedures, yet no need to 
rely on reputation mechanisms, nonlegal sanctions, or any other 
instruments of private enforcement that, necessarily, erect costly 
entry barriers. 
Private legal systems, however, are distinct from typical 
arbitration precisely because they rest atop private enforcement 
mechanisms—and, in fact, they tend to prohibit their members from 
seeking relief from state-sponsored courts, as victors in arbitration are 
 
 68. A popular hypothesis that accompanied examinations of underdeveloped legal systems 
was that, in fact, relational contracting and private ordering would inevitably succumb to public 
courts. See, e.g., P.J. FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE § 31 (12th ed. 2006) 
(“Although custom is an important source of law in early times, its importance continuously 
diminishes as the legal system grows.”); see also Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and 
the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 216 
(1994) (“Many intellectuals believe that centralized law is inevitable, just as they once believed 
that socialism was inevitable.”). 
 69. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, 201–208 (2006).  
 70. E.g., id. § 3; see also Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law: Lessons from the 
Middle and the Digital Ages 7 (Stanford Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 195, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=220252 (“‘Private’ arbitration is a creature of contract and so is as much a matter of 
‘public’ law as any contract.”). 
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able to do.71 Given the costs of employing private enforcement,72 why 
would private legal systems also institutionalize costly coordinated 
punishments rather than piggyback off public courts? Or conversely, 
why do so many industries rely primarily on standard arbitration in 
which arbitration rulings are enforceable in state court, yet certain 
industries operate entirely outside the legal system? 
That private legal systems rely only on private enforcement, and 
are thus distinct from typical arbitration, suggests that something 
more than administrative savings is at work. Consistent with 
proponents of the New Formalism, we see a move across all forms of 
arbitration—and in several areas of state law as well—toward rules 
and procedures that lead to swift and predictable judgments.73 But we 
see significant variation in enforcement, with some parties enforcing 
arbitration through the courts and others participating in insular 
merchant communities that reject state-sponsored courts and rely 
instead on coordinated punishments. Because administrative 
efficiencies cannot explain this variation, an alternative source of 
economizing must be at work. All merchant communities that invoke 
private sanctions use specialized law,74 yet specialized law is 
widespread beyond these insular merchant communities.75 The key to 
understanding these unusual private legal systems, then, lies much 
more in the economics of enforcement than in the economics of 
adjudication. 
The adjudication-determination hypothesis’ third error is its 
presumption that private legal systems require arbitrators and well-
 
 71. Bernstein suggests that diamond merchants are welcome to seek confirmation of a 
Diamond Dealers’ Club judgment in state courts, but that such confirmation “is rarely 
necessary.” Bernstein, supra note 51, at 129–30. I would argue, however, that state-court 
confirmation would be futile. Instead of state courts serving as a supplemental enforcement 
mechanism, state-court failures trigger the need for alternative enforcement. See Richman, 
Antitrust, supra note 67, at 330–34 (“These important limitations on the capabilities of state 
courts force the diamond industry to depend instead on private mechanisms to enforce 
contracts.”). 
 72. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 73. See, e.g., supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text. 
 74. See Bernstein, supra note 51, at 115 (“[T]raders . . . have developed an elaborate, 
internal system of rules, complete with distinctive institutions and sanctions, to handle disputes 
among industry members.”); Richman, supra note 30, at 397 (“The [Diamond Dealers Club’s] 
system of arbitration and information exchange thus sets the stage for other family- and 
community-based institutions to enforce industry’s executory contracts . . . .”). 
 75. See generally Thomas Schultz, Private Legal Systems: What Cyberspace Might Teach 
Legal Theorists, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 151 (2007) (discussing various systems of private law that 
govern aspects of the online marketplace). 
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developed private law. After all, the hypothesis assumes, if private 
legal systems emerge because of administrative efficiencies, then it 
would be strange indeed to have a legal system without any legal 
substance or procedures. It would be like agreeing to arbitration 
without identifying an arbitrator. 
In fact, however, in parts of the diamond industry, disputes are 
privately resolved without judges or law. Although Professor 
Bernstein’s famous analysis of the New York Diamond Dealers Club 
describes a world of arbitration with clear substantive rules and 
clearly identified arbitrators and procedures, India’s diamond center 
is very different. Consider the following exchange: 
Author: So what happens when merchants have a disagreement? 
Merchant: They resolve it. They always want to work things out. 
Author: But what happens when they can’t resolve it themselves, 
when there was a genuine misunderstanding or disagreement that 
has no easy compromise solution? 
Merchant: Then they’ll find a senior, respected person in the 
industry and that person will resolve it.76 
Ninety-five percent of the world’s diamonds flow through India’s 
diamond center. With its epicenter located in Mumbai and its 
burgeoning cutting and polishing industry in the nearby state of 
Gujarat, India is an emerging capital of the diamond industry and is 
gradually overtaking New York and Antwerp in significance.77 Yet 
there are no arbitrators and no binding arbitrations. Parties simply 
resolve disputes on their own and establish their own order without 
any law.78 
 
 76. Interview with confidential source in the Diamond District, Mumbai, India (Mar. 13, 
2008).   
 77. See Manjeet Kripalani, Polishing the Diamond Business, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 11, 
2000 (“De Beers, the longtime monopolist, is finding its cartel usurped by Canada, Russia, and 
Australia, which want to go directly to diamond-cutting centers without using a middleman—a 
move that could raise India’s current 55% share of the world diamond industry.”); Nicky 
Oppenheimer, Diamonds and Dictators, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1999, at A27 (stating that more 
than 700,000 people are employed in the diamond-cutting industry in India). For a general 
discussion of India’s emergence in the diamond industry, see PIRAMAL, BUSINESS MAHARAJAS 
315–62 (1996). 
 78. For a discussion of how globalization forces are changing the diamond industry and of 
how Mumbai’s emergence as a diamond center is a quintessential reflection of those forces, see 
Barak D. Richman, Ethnic Networks, Extra-Legal Certainty and Globalisation: Peering into the 
Diamond Industry, in CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 31 (Volkmar 
Gessner ed., 2009). 
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These three problems are enough to discard the adjudication-
determination hypothesis. Efficient adjudication procedures and 
substantive rules cannot drive the emergence of private legal systems. 
The flexibility of arbitration enables achieving administrative 
efficiencies without developing private enforcement systems, and 
diamond centers outside the United States reveal that private 
enforcement systems thrive without structured arbitration. At the 
very least, this conclusion should dampen the general enthusiasm for 
private legal systems. If adjudication efficiencies are not responsible 
for the emergence and survival of private legal systems, then scholars 
should be more cautious in endorsing them as a model for arbitration 
systems. 
The heart of the hypothesis’ shortcoming, and the corresponding 
weakness in the conventional legal-centric theory that undergirds it, is 
its failure to recognize the particular costs inherent in private legal 
systems. Legal scholars thus overstate the efficiencies of private legal 
systems and thus incorrectly overpredict their incidence. 
V.  PRIVATE LEGAL SYSTEMS, PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD 
How should private legal systems be understood vis-à-vis other 
self-enforcement systems? And what then predicts the emergence of 
private legal systems in the modern economy? 
Whereas current scholarship emphasizes adjudication efficiencies 
and thus conflates private legal systems with conventional arbitration 
systems, a proper approach begins by examining the role of 
enforcement costs through a lens of institutional economics. In short, 
the adjudication-determination hypothesis should be discarded for the 
enforcement-determination hypothesis. Focusing on this very different 
category of efficiency considerations illustrates that private legal 
systems belong much more squarely in the order-without-law 
mechanism along with other systems that rest upon coordinated social 
sanctions or private enforcement methods. Despite appearing like 
typical arbitration systems, they arise out of rather particular 
circumstances and economize on what could be called enforcement 
costs. The enforcement-determination hypothesis suggests that 
enforcement efficiencies are the horse that drives the emergence of 
private legal systems, and adjudication efficiencies are largely 
secondary. This hypothesis means that the schema depicted in Figure 
1 is not just an illustration of alternative categories but also a 
depiction of a causal, sequential model. 
RICHMAN IN PRINTER PROOF REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/4/2012  3:01 PM 
2012]     NORMS & LAW: HORSE BEFORE THE CART 763 
What are enforcement costs and how, according to economic 
logic, do they determine the incidence of private legal systems? A 
starting point begins with a core principle of institutional economics, 
which is that all institutional arrangements exhibit certain efficiencies 
and costs, and articulating those comparative costs and benefits can 
predict their emergence under different economic circumstances. A 
comparative assessment of public versus private enforcement requires 
assessing the institutional capacities of each mechanism.79 
The table below summarizes a comparative assessment of 
enforcement costs associated with the alternative mechanisms.80 








Efficiencies – + 
Nonexclusivity + – 
 
The key insight reflected in the table is that both private and 
public enforcement exhibit comparative efficiencies and costs, 
relative to one another. Consistent with much of the legal literature, 
private legal systems do achieve adjudication efficiencies that are 
unattainable in public courts. As was discussed in Part III, they rest 
on substantive and procedural rules, allowing for predictable rulings 
and stark factual determinations that do not require significant 
litigation costs. They follow expedited procedures that assure prompt 
judgments. And they rely on arbitrators who are industry insiders and 
have both expertise and experience closely relevant to the disputes 
they judge. However expensive, slow, and inaccurate state-sponsored 
 
 79. A more complete institutional analysis requires comparing multiple mechanisms, 
including vertically integrated firms. This analysis would include the paradigmatic make-or-buy 
question in institutional economics and an assessment of both concerted sanctions and vertical 
integration as alternative private mechanisms. For a more complete assessment, see Richman, 
Private Ordering, supra note 67, at 2337–51. 
 80. For some policy implications of this comparative assessment, see Richman, Antitrust, 
supra note 67, at 368–72. 
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courts can be, private legal systems build rules and procedures to be 
cheaper, faster, and more accurate. 
A significant shortcoming of private enforcement, however, is 
that it can only reach those who subscribe to it—reputation 
mechanisms can only police those who place value in maintaining a 
good reputation. Professor Galanter remarked that although 
“indigenous communities” enjoy powers that are unavailable to 
public courts, “the indigenous tribunal faces the problem of obtaining 
leverage over those who are impervious to community opinion, 
getting them to submit to its jurisdiction or to comply with its 
decisions.”81 Thus, the reach of private law is limited to long-term 
players who are assured of, and who credibly are committed to 
pursuing, a long horizon of transactions. 
This limitation leads to a critical drawback of private ordering: 
reputation-based private enforcement erects sizable entry barriers. 
Because only participating long-term players have incentives to 
cooperate, newcomers who have not yet established a good 
reputation are unable to commit credibly to uphold their contractual 
promises. Thus, Professors John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff 
noted that “[t]he corollary of ongoing relationships is a reluctance to 
deal with firms outside the relationship.”82 Even an honest merchant 
who has yet to demonstrate a good reputation will not be able to 
transact business with other merchants. 
Entry barriers impose many inefficiencies, especially dynamic 
inefficiencies, to an economic system. They limit the threat of 
superior competitors—those with lower costs, superior skill, or new 
technologies—and shelter inefficient incumbents. The exclusivity of 
privately ordered reputation mechanisms also sustains economic 
homogeneity and conformity, precluding entrants with new business 
models and entrants who might experiment with innovative 
techniques. Relatedly, an ossified merchant community is more likely 
to resist value-added competition. Because trade in a private system 
occurs within a closed community comprised of traders who are 
linked by channels of information and communication, merchants are 
well positioned to collude on price or collectively deny competitive 
entrants access to supply networks and other necessary resources.83 
 
 81. Galanter, supra note 3, at 26. 
 82. McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 54, at 2454.  
 83. Both Professors McMillan and Woodruff and Professor Richard McAdams have 
observed that relational contracting and closed economic networks can impose noneconomic 
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These significant dynamic costs are tradeoffs with the also 
significant benefits of greater transactional security and low-cost 
adjudication. Recognizing these reciprocal costs of private legal 
systems helps explain why these systems are not more widespread in 
the modern economy. Similarly, it explains why the emergence of 
reliable state-sponsored courts coincided with the waning of 
relational exchange that relied on private enforcement. Accordingly, 
enthusiasts of private legal systems should pause and consider these 
significant drawbacks of reputational enforcement. But perhaps more 
important, this Essay’s approach illustrates why enforcement costs 
determine the incidence of private legal systems and thus are the 
horse that leads the cart. 
This Essay’s approach also should bring more clarity to our 
understanding of private legal systems. Although those systems are 
often characterized as arbitration systems with specialized law, in 
reality they are dramatically different from conventional arbitration. 
Private legal systems do indeed rely on arbitration, and they similarly 
are credited with developing specialized systems of substantive and 
procedural law. But both the arbitration and legal qualities of these 
systems belie the true economic—and often social and historical—
forces that spawn their existence and create their efficiencies. They 
instead emerge only when the benefits of attaining better 
enforcement outweigh the heavy costs of creating entry barriers. This 
is a much more balanced and determinative assessment than one 
involving adjudication costs. 
Thus, although Figure 1 depicts a very parsimonious mapping of 
alternative enforcement regimes, it offers some lasting lessons. First, 
it separates public from private enforcement, thereby properly 
distinguishing private legal systems from typical arbitration. Second, 
it emphasizes that economizing on enforcement costs, not 
adjudication costs, determines the most efficient enforcement regime 
 
harms as well, such as bigotry and persistent discrimination. See Richard H. McAdams, 
Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 
108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1049–53 (1995) (describing the economic forces that led to the 
development of the Jim Crow South); McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 54, at 2423 (“Private 
order also can cause or perpetuate racial or gender discrimination.”). Professors Curtis 
Milhaupt and Mark West and Professor Diego Gambetta also reveal that trust-based exchange 
and closed ethnic networks can use violence, in addition to reputational mechanisms, to enforce 
compliance. See DIEGO GAMBETTA, THE SICILIAN MAFIA: THE BUSINESS OF PRIVATE 
PROTECTION 173 (1993) (“Thieves who do not respect protected customers are punished, at 
times with extreme violence.”); Milhaupt & West, supra note 31, at 47–48 (discussing the 
problem of organized crime in high-trust societies like Japan). 
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for particular merchant transactions. And third, it poses deep 
challenges to the conventional legal-centric theory that aims to 
understand commerce through legal rules rather than through the 
underlying institutions. 
CONCLUSION 
Although private legal systems have captured the imagination of 
a wide assortment of scholars and disciplines, that attention has not 
yet translated into a comprehensive understanding of those systems. 
One source of confusion has been a preoccupation with 
administrative costs, which are naturally of primary concern to legal 
scholars but in fact are a diversion from the underlying economic 
forces that sustain private enforcement mechanisms. This 
preoccupation might be another instance of Professor Galanter’s legal 
centralism, and perhaps the biggest lesson is that even if organizations 
look and act like courts or arbitrators, they in fact might more closely 
resemble instruments used in prelegal societies. 
At the very least, scholars studying private legal systems should 
scrutinize enforcement costs more than administrative costs, and they 
should make greater use of institutional economics than litigation 
economics. But there might also need to be a wholesale reevaluation 
of the implications that have emerged from studies of private legal 
systems. Rather than heralding their efficiencies, there should be 
greater recognition of their costs; rather than encouraging industries 
to take up tailored arbitration, there should be greater study of when 
private legal systems emerge and where they succeed; and rather than 
treating private legal systems as a squarely legal product, there should 
be greater adherence to early law and society conclusions, that legal 
and legal-like processes must be viewed within the underlying social 
and economic context in which they emerge. The significance of 
private legal systems is not how they appear but what lies beneath. 
 
